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Ethical Considerations
Early American sociologists were very concerned about ethical issues and
particularly those connected with the goals of justice, social welfare, democracy
and peace. Courses reflected these interests1 as did professional meetings. For
example, in 1892 The School of Applied Ethics in Massachusetts held a week
of "instruction. . . devoted to the Theory of Social Progress, being a study in
sociology" (Adams, 1893: viii) during which Franklin Giddings (1893) gave a
presentation entitled "The Ethics of Social Progress." Another week was de-
voted to "Philanthropy in Social Progress," and sociologist Jane Addams
(1893a,b) gave two presentations on social settlements.
The earliest presentations and publications on ethics include Jane Addams'
1896 presentation at Hull House entitled "Ethical Impulses Working Toward
Social Reconstruction," her lecture at the University of Chicago in 1906 on
changed ideals and public morality and her article (Addams, 1897–98) "Ethical
Survival in Municipal Corruption." Two articles focusing on ethics also ap-
peared in early issues of The American Journal of Sociology—Alfred Lloyd's
(1905) "Ethics and its History" and Harald Hoffding's (1905) "On the Relation
between Sociology and Ethics." In addition, Charlotte Perkins Gilman gave a
series of six lectures in 1895 to the Social Science Club at Hull House.2 Her
last lecture was entitled "Social Ethics."
Sociologists during the last 100 years have been concerned with the range
of topics that fall under the heading "ethics." Some have undertaken studies
in which they have tried to be objective observers providing needed information
about the development of, and adherence to, different ethical systems. At the
other end of the spectrum are those who have tried to provide passionate and
persuasive analyses which call into question the kinds of topics sociologists
choose to study and the frequently uncritical acceptance of funds for social
science research and practice. These writers want sociologists to accept respon-
sibility for the outcomes of their actions or lack of involvement.
The documents which we have chosen to include here are two articles and
the current ethics code of the Sociological Practice Association. The first article
is "Ethical Limitations on Sociological Reporting," by Joseph Fichter and
William Kolb, which first appeared in a 1953 issue of the American Sociological
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Review. Fichter and Kolb present what they identify as important variables in
developing an ethical system. While they are dealing specifically with the re-
porting of research on communities and groups, what they say has applications
to sociological practice. The authors mention that an "explicit code of eth-
ics . . . seems urgently needed.''
In 1981, The Hastings Center published Martin Bulmer's "The British
Tradition of Social Administration: Moral Concerns at the Expense of Scientific
Rigor." Bulmer provides a great deal of information about the relationship
between scientific interests and ethical concerns in the development of sociology
in the United States and social administration in Great Britain.
Bulmer (1981:41) prefers the "enlightenment model. . . where the social
sciences . . . provide a general framework within which social processes can be
examined." He does not advocate sociological practice and says, in fact, that
sociologists "need not provide definite predictions about the direction of social
change, nor offer technocratic solutions to discrete problems." He does think
that the framework offered by social scientists "must necessarily take into
account of the ends of social action, and deal with the moral dimension of
human affairs." Bulmer asks if it is possible to "integrate formal theory and
rigorous methodology with historical and ethical sensitivity."
Fichter and Kolb recognized the need for an ethical code and they, as well
as Bulmer, discussed the difficulty of combining scientific rigor and ethical
sensitivity. While these writers directed their remarks to the research commu-
nity, the issues are even more complex when one tries to establish a complete
ethical code, one which will cover research, teaching, and practice.
The ethics code developed by the Sociological Practice Association
(adopted in 1982 and revised in 1987) is the most complete code to cover the
professional activities of clinical and applied sociologists. The association re-
viewed approximately twenty codes of professional groups before selecting a
basic model and adapting it to the specific needs of scholar-practitioners in
relation to their students, colleagues, employers, and clients.
The code underlines the values of the association including humanism and
contributing to the advancement of human welfare. All association members
who apply for clinical certification are expected, as part of the certification
application process, to write an ethical statement. They also will be questioned
about their ethical practices as part of their certification demonstrations. All
members of the association are provided with opportunities to revise the code




1. As Bulmer (1981:35) noted: "Albion Small and E. A. Ross combined in their teaching scientific
analysis and direct ethical prescription. From 1906 sociology at Harvard University was taught in the
Department of Social Ethics."
2. The Working People's Social Science Club met weekly at Hull-House from 1890–1895. Some
information about the establishment of the club and its programs is available in the Jane Addams
Memorial Collection at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
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In his primary task as the discoverer of new knowledge, the modern scien-
tist is governed by the obligations to search for truth, to be objective, to discern
the relevant, to check meticulously his data, and, in some circles, to accept
responsibility for the use to which his knowledge is put. This ethical code,
however, fails to cover the problems arising from the relations between the
scientist and the objects of his observation and experimentation. This may be
due in part to the very conceptualization of phenomena as "objects." Only
"subjects" have rights which must be respected.
There is evidence, of course, that social scientists are vaguely aware that
they incur responsibilities which extend beyond the procedural ethics of science
itself: that men are subjects as well as objects and that even when studied as
objects they retain certain of their rights to privacy and respect. Thus the experi-
ments on living human bodies of prisoners, made by Nazi doctors, gained them
infamy rather than fame. The theoretical literature of American psychiatry hides
the identity of most of its patients. And sociologists and anthropologists fre-
quently attempt to disguise the communities they study.
The lack of consensus in this area of responsibility attests to the fact that
the norms underlying such efforts to respect people who are studied have never
been systematically formulated as part of the procedure of scientific research
and reporting. Indeed individuals and groups receive the greatest protection
when scientific research is linked with the doctor-patient relation as in the case
of psychiatry. In other areas protection seems to depend upon a diffuse and
uncertain feeling of respect for the human "object." This protection is
Reprinted from American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 5, October, 1953, pp. 544–550.
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adequate, however, only where it does not interfere seriously with the gathering
and reporting of data or where its violation would take such extreme form as to
severely shock both the scientist and his society.
Under present conditions, the possibility of disturbance and shock seems
greatest where research and reporting directly involve identifiable small groups
and individuals. Research workers also seem to be effectively barred from
experimentation which threaten the physical wholeness of the individual. Be-
yond these areas of investigation every research worker seems to be largely on
his own in determining what research shall be conducted and what report shall
be made so far as the impact of the research and the report on the objects of the
study are concerned.
In this state of normlessness even the individual and the small group can
be threatened if the possibility of identification is only indirect or if the violation
of rights is not obvious and flagrant. Thus men may not be plunged into freezing
water involuntarily, but children have been placed in authoritarian situations to
discover the effects on their attitudes and behavior. Sexual relations between
husband and wife cannot be observed by the family sociologist, but other forms
of private behavior have been observed and reported. The psychiatrist will guard
the identity of his patient, but the student of a community may report behavior
on the part of an individual who can be indirectly identified by other members
of the community or by other people in the larger society.
Although the psychologist and the social psychologist face ethical problems
in experimenting with human beings, the sociologist seems most vulnerable in
his studies of small groups and communities. His problem, since he does not
often experiment, seems to be the question of whether there are ethical limita-
tions on the "complete" objectivity of a research report concerning such groups
and communities, for it is in this area of research that there are signs that the
ethical sense of the sociologist is either dormant or only intermittently and
uncertainly active. An explicit code of ethics which will govern the social
scientist in reporting such data seems urgently needed.
In attempting to develop a system of relational ethics the sociologist must
remember that while the people he studies have rights, these rights cannot be
secured by an unqualified assertion of the "subject" status of his objects of
investigation. It is an obvious absurdity to assert that these "subjects" are
entitled to absolute anonymity, privacy, and protection, for in various circum-
stances the sociologist may be obligated to describe in full detail the actions of
identifiable groups and individuals. Moreover the development of a code of
ethics will not relieve the sociologist of moral choice, but can serve only as a
guide for the making of decisions for which he must accept responsibility.
Having said all this, however, it remains true that sociologists need to formulate
a system of ethical norms to protect the objects of sociological reporting. It
is as a tentative statement of the conditions relevant to such norms and of a
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few of the most important norms themselves that the following discussion is
offered.
Before presenting our conception of some of the important normative vari-
ables in the formulation of such a system of ethics, it is necessary to consider
first the matrix of conditions into which the system must be placed. Two aspects
of this matrix seem particularly important. The first of these has to do with the
various groups of people to whom the reporting sociologist has obligations; the
objects of the study are only one such group. The second aspect concerns the
fact that even in community and small group studies certain kinds of data and
certain modes of data presentation pose the ethical problem in its most intense
form, while other data and modes of presentation offer only minor problems. It
is necessary to distinguish these factors, since, as scientists, maximum freedom
is desirable and hence no needless restrictions are in order.
In preparing a research report on a small community or group the sociolo-
gist has a moral duty toward several different groups. Because his obligations
to each of these differ in kind and degree while at the same time they condition
and limit one another, it seems necessary to set forth briefly the categories into
which they fall.
1. For practical, as well as moral reasons, the sociologist must consider the
wishes and needs of those persons who have allowed, invited, sponsored, or
cooperated with the study. Management of a factory group, officers of a labor
union, ministers, and city officials, are all examples of people who may have
some concern for the results of sponsored research. The sociologist's obligations
to such persons are truthfulless, the honoring of confidences, scientific objectiv-
ity, and honest reporting.
2. The sociologist has obligations to the source from which research funds
were obtained. Like anyone who enters a contractual agreement, he has the
ordinary obligations to employ these funds honestly and usefully, and to abide
by the terms of the agreement concerning publication and ownership of data,
and by any other explicit provisions which might have been incorporated in the
contract.
3. The publisher of the research report has a call upon the moral considera-
tion of the sociologist. Again the obligations are derived from the ordinary
desirability of honesty and thoroughness, or from legal rights relating to libel
suits and other embarrassments in which the report may involve the publisher.
4. Social scientists in general may be said to have a claim on the findings
of the social researcher. The scientist's colleagues have a moral expectation
that the findings will be made available to them in a serious, honest, and
competent report. In addition to these expectations which do not differ much
from expectations of professionals in other areas of work, there are the specifi-
cally scientific demands for a free exchange of data and knowledge unhindered
by secrecy and suppression.
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5. Another kind of group has a similar claim, perhaps not on the individual
scientist but certainly on the discipline, to receive the findings of social re-
search. In the long run this group is the society itself, for it is particularly
important that social science knowledge ultimately become the possession of all
the people. If there are reasons for the holding back of research findings from
the general public for a short time, this group will still contain, at a minimum
estimate, the key persons in a community or group who are in a position to
utilize the research findings in programs of social improvement. The sociologist
himself must bear the responsibility for determining who these persons are,
unless they are defined by legal norms of the community of which the social
scientist himself is a member.
6. Against the claims of all these groups on the findings of the sociologist,
there exist the rights of the community studied, its subgroups, and its individual
members. Their rights to secrecy, privacy, reputation, and respect, will vary
according to circumstances and to the demands of the other groups, but they are
intrinsically present—a society like our own which in its central tradition ac-
cords dignity and worth to the individual. The sociologist has not discharged his
duties when he has met his obligations to sponsors, fund sources, publisher,
social scientists, and the general public; nor has he completely discharged them
when he makes a perfunctory effort at disguise, ambiguity, or anonymity. He
is always faced with the moral problem of how much to tell about the lives and
habits of the members of the community or small group.
The problem varies in its intensity, however, with the kind of data and with
the mode of presentation. It seems obvious that historical material allows more
latitude for reporting than contemporary material. Every study of a small group
or community seems to require a brief sketch of historical background, and
through this research the scientist may discover certain skeletons in the closet.
Their revelation may be pertinent to the understanding of the group and will
probably not intrude too greatly upon the community's or its individuals' reputa-
tions.
Within the area of contemporary material a distinction can be drawn be-
tween studies of primitive societies and civilized communities. It is supposed
that the details of social life among the Samoans were not reported to these
people, and if any reputations suffered from such study it was only among
non-Samoans. There have been instances, however, of anthropologists' reports
getting back to American Indian tribes, causing some dissension and suspicion
among the members of the tribe. In either case the sociologist must consider
these people as the subjects of human rights, even though the prospect of moral
damage may not be great.
In studying contemporary communities the problem of reporting varies
according to whether the data concerned are sacred or non-sacred. The analysis
of behavior patterns which involve high traditional values (like religion, family
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and sex, ethnic and group loyalties) should, of course, be as objective as pos-
sible, but an effort should be made to avoid needless and callous affront to the
people who hold such values and such an effort requires special attention and
care. In non-sacred areas (such as economic and political activities, housing and
recreational problems) there can be greater freedom of reporting.
A related and equally important distinction must be made between public
and private facts. This is something more than the difference between hidden
and open knowledge. By definition, the sociologist deals with social and group
relations. Hence, in a sense, his data can rarely concern completely private and
secret activities. Nevertheless it is obvious that widely-known facts allow a
much wider margin of expression in the research report.
The manner of presenting the data may be equally important as the kind of
data presented in increasing or lowering the intensity of the moral problem of
what to report in a community or small group study. Although the custom of
sociologists of providing anonymity to the community, group, or individual is
not an adequate safeguard of the rights of these subjects, it does make possible
a wider margin of expression than would a complete and open identification.
There are, however, other and more important differences of mode of presenta-
tion.
The happiest situation for the social scientist is one in which statistical
analysis of, and reporting on, the actions and characteristics of people is pos-
sible. Where large numbers of people are involved it is obvious that the problem
of ethical limitations on the report hardly exists. But even in communities where
situations are revealed that may be somewhat distasteful, the sub-groups and the
individual may be adequately protected by the use of statistical categories.
As soon as the sociologist leaves the field of quantitative analysis and
attempts to describe in conceptual terms the social relations in a small group or
community, the problem of what to report becomes much greater. Even when
the community is cloaked in anonymity, indirect identification is almost always
possible, and there is likely to be a subtle and unintended violation of human
rights. The threat becomes even greater when the sociologist adds to his descrip-
tion of the social relations in the group or community an interpretation of the
motivation which supports these relations and other social behavior. Thus,
where systematic sociological description and interpretation of motivation com-
bine, the sociologist faces the gravest moral challenge, and particularly so where
this mode of description and analysis is applied to a leading member of the
group. The likelihood that such a person will be identified and his social behav-
ior and personal reputation placed under scrutiny by his fellows on the basis of
the research report is very great. Here, more than anywhere else, the sociologist
must take care not to needlessly injure another human being.
The problem of truth telling thus becomes a circumstantial one. This means
that while telling the truth cannot per se be wrong or harmful, the ethical
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question of whether or not to include a certain objective fact always arises in
relation to person and circumstances. Thus complete objectivity, or telling all
the truth in all circumstances, is not necessarily a morally good act.
This is true for several reasons. The researcher is, of course, bound to
secrecy where information has been given in confidence or where he has made
promises of secrecy. At the same time, as a scientist, he will discover natural
secrets, which by their seriousness demand silence on the part of the reporter.
There is also the problem of detraction—the injury of another's reputation by
revealing what is detrimental but true about him. If the harmful fact is already
widely disseminated or if the subject is mistaken in the belief that the fact will
result in the impairment of his reputation, the sociologist may not have any
obligation to conceal the fact. Otherwise its revelation is a serious matter.
In summary, it can be said the problem appears in its most intense form
when some member of a community or group is singled out for description and
analysis and where such description and analysis may result in the revealing of
secrets, the violation of privacy, or the detraction of reputation. Placed in this
situation the sociologist must evaluate the claims of the individual, or of the
sub-group and community, in their relations with the claims of the research
sponsors, the donors of funds, the publisher of the report, the expectations of
colleagues, and the rights of the larger society. We suggest that if the researcher
accepts the values of human dignity and worth and does not want needlessly to
injure the objects of his investigation, he will take the following four variables
into account in attempting to arrive at a decision.
1. The sociologist's definition of the nature of science. Some positivists
seem to regard science only as a fascinating game played according to a set of
rules.* It is doubtful that the sociologist using this conception of science may
ever legitimately overrule the rights of the people studied. The simple wish of
the people to conceal certain aspects of their behavior must then be considered
sufficient to bar the report of that behavior.
If one regards science as a search for truth as an end to itself, the demands
of the objectivity of science will carry much weight in the decision to publish
all pertinent data. Except in history, however, the truth for which the social
scientist searches is nomothetic, not idiographic, truth. It may be necessary to
base generalizations on certain idiographic items, but man has the entire span
of his career on earth to discover and disclose such items. Certainly a particular
item of current behavior turned up in a community study need not be used to
support a generalization if such use inflicts injury on the people being
investigated.
* "Science after all is one of the games played by the children of this world, and it may very
well be that those who prefer other games are in their generation wiser." Carroll C. Pratt, The Logic
of Modern Psychology, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939, p.57.
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There is a third conception of pure science. Social scientists may believe
that science is both a rigidly ruled game and a search for truth which is valuable
for itself, but they usually also believe that science well developed and used by
experts or disseminated among the people can make for a better life. There is a
sense of urgency about accomplishing this mission of pure science in the modern
world. Thus, within this perspective, considerable pressure arises to ignore the
rights of people who are scientifically studied. Despite this pressure it remains
true that a wilful disregard for the rights of persons and groups to their privacy,
reputations, and secrets, will tend to destroy the very values which the scientist
hopes his basic research can render more achievable.
Frequently the scientist makes a community or small group study not as a
pure scientist but in one sense or another as an applied scientist. He may carry
on the research for what he himself considers desirable practical ends; he may
be employed by officials of the community or group or by those of the larger
society; or he may be employed by some private group with a specific selfish
or altruistic interest. In all three of these instances there is pressure to report all
the significant findings even though injury may be done to the objects of the
study. Nevertheless the sociologist must abide by the rule that he exercise every
effort to determine whether or not the values to be implemented by the study,
and the probability of being able to achieve them through the use of its findings,
justify the harm done to the members of the community or group.
Preoccupation with applied science is frequently accompanied by the temp-
tation to look for and publish data which will further the realization of what the
researcher himself regards as the good society or community. He is likely to
believe that all of his data must be revealed in all circumstances. It appears to
us that a scientist of this persuasion is most in need of the virtues of tolerance,
compassion, and love, because he is in danger of placing the considerations of
the "good" society above all consideration of individual rights and injuries.
The hired scientist, moreover, cannot avoid responsibility for revealing data
injurious to individuals and groups by pleading loyalty to community or nation
or by indicating his contractual responsibilities to a private group. Loyalty to
community or nation may require injury to individuals and groups, but in such
cases the scientist shares whatever guilt is incurred with all other responsible
agencies. In instances of purely contractual research the scientist must accept
full responsibility, because loyalty to nation or community is not involved. He
is free to refuse the job, and if the values of the employing group are wrong or
do not justify the amount of injury done the scientist must accept the moral
responsibility.
2. Determination of the extent to which a person or group will be injured
by the publication of data concerning their behavior. Those instances in which
the scientist can foretell with certitude that serious injury will be done to the
objects of his study seem to be very few in number. It is also likely that the
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largest proportion of his data will be free of possibly injurious materials. It is
the in-between area of probable injury that is most difficult to determine and
yet which must be determined.
To know what the effect of exposing a group's secrets will be, to realize
how seriously a person's reputation may be damaged, and to visualize the
effects of violation of privacy presupposes knowledge on the part of the scientist
which he may not have. This knowledge can be approached to the extent to
which the scientist saturates himself in the social relations of the group which
he studies. It probably cannot be achieved by the aloof scientist who simply
culls the reports of those who have done the actual and basic data collecting.
Since there is a great difference between imaginary and objective deroga-
tion of reputation, the sociologist may tend to brush off the former as relevant
and uncontrollable. Human decency, however, would seem to require that the
scientist make an effort to inquire even into this possibility of psychological and
subjective injury. The scientist cannot guard against all such contingencies and
against the unexpected and unwarranted complaints of people, but he should
do his human best to avoid them ahead of time and to be sympathetic to them
if they come.
If the sociologist attempts to interpret the social behavior of the people he
studies, he must assess the responsibility of the people for their own actions.
False sentimentality must not result in the denial of the fact that a person must
accept the consequences of the acts for which he is responsible. The scientist
cannot erase the responsibilities, duties, and obligations, of the objects of his
study. Yet, at the same time, he must recognize that the human being is never
completely responsible for his actions, and that in many cases factors over
which the person or group has no control may come close to completely deter-
mining certain acts. Since the assessment of responsibility will be contained in
the research report, injury can be done if the assessment is not carefully made.
3. The degree to which people or groups are actually members of a moral
community of which the scientist is also a member. At the core of the Western
value system is a belief in the basic dignity and worth of the human being. This
belief is based on different assumptions according to the particular stream of
tradition in which one locates it: the Fatherhood of God, natural law, universal
human needs and aspirations, or human reason. Whatever the base, the belief
implies that men are bound to one another in a moral community. Membership
in this community requires that the individual's rights to privacy, secrecy, and
reputation be respected, even though the human beings studied may not be
members of the sociologist's own society.
The belief also implies that a man or group can renounce membership in the
moral community by choosing modes of action which violate these basic values
of dignity and worth. In mid-century it seems probable that men like Hitler and
Stalin, organized groups like "Murder Incorporated," the Ku Klux Klan, and
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some others, have placed themselves outside the moral community and have
surrendered the protection of its norms. Thus the social scientist need have no
qualms about reporting in full detail the activities of such groups and people.
Although this norm has never been explicitly formulated, it has guided a great
deal of the research and reporting in social science.
Yet the decision of the sociologist to place particular persons or groups
outside the moral community involves great responsibility, and he must be
careful that his criteria of judgment permit tolerance, compassion, and wisdom.
This is especially the case when he studies "unpopular" racial, religious and
political groups, prostitutes, homosexuals, drug addicts, and the psychologi-
cally ill, the poor and powerless. It is hardly questionable that these people
remain members of the moral community and hence retain their rights of pri-
vacy, respect, and secrecy. The needs of the society may require a limitation
of their rights by the courts or by the social scientist in his reporting, but basic
rights can be limited only to the extent that they must be limited. Beyond that
point such people must be treated in the same way as other members of the
moral community.
The recognition of basic human rights which accompany membership in the
moral community is an important means by which social scientists can avoid the
dangers of the use of purely subjective criteria. Within the consensus of the
Western tradition it is objectively true that there are moral evils and modes of
action which place the perpetrator outside this community. We must know as
much as possible about such people and the scientist need have little inhibition
in the report he provides about them. All other persons and groups, no matter
how personally distasteful to the scientist, seem to require the respect of their
fellow-members in the moral community.
4. The degree to which the larger society, the local community, or the
group, needs the data of the research. Real urgency must be defined in terms
of the pressing needs of a group, community, or society, or in terms of some
impending problem of which the scientist but not the group or community being
studied is aware. Rights and duties are never qualified in society and one of the
qualifications seems to be that the society sometimes has a prior right to infor-
mation which is necessary and useful for itself even though it may be harmful
to an individual or sub-group.
The social scientist may find himself in one of several moral situations
when he is trying to determine whether or not the social need is greater than the
individual or group right. If the duly appointed authorities of a community or
of the larger society believe certain information to be vitally needed, there is a
prima facie case for the scientist to reveal such information . However, these
authorities must show to the scientist the ground for the need. If he does not
know and cannot find out from the authorities whether there is an urgent need
for certain data which will be harmful to individuals and sub-groups, he is free
ETHICAL LIMITATIONS ON SOCIOLOGICAL REPORTING 157
of moral obligation to reveal it. If he is certain that the information is not
necessary, he may in good conscience refuse to reveal it even though the
authorities demand to know it. It must be recognized that his freedom in such
instances is moral and not legal, and he may have to pay a price for his refusal.
In a similar manner the obligations which the scientist has to the group
studied may require the revelation of information damaging to individuals or
sub-groups. In this instance the scientist himself is likely to be the best judge
of the need for his data. If he understands and accepts the basic values of the
group and takes his obligation to the group seriously, he may find it imperative
to disclose such information. Since he cannot plead ignorance, and since there
is no demand from competent higher authority, the responsibility for the assess-
ment of urgency rests squarely on the scientist.
Finally, even though neither the higher authority nor the representatives of
the group studied place any demands upon him, he may become aware of facts
which are vitally needed by the social group studied or by the society. In such
cases he must not only accept the responsibility for violating the rights of
individuals and groups, but also must arrive at his decision with very little
outside aid. In clear-cut instances where the comparison and balancing of the
rights of the various claimants can be easily accomplished, the decision may
be easily reached. But it is certainly in this area that the researcher will be forced
to consider most thoroughly the importance which he, himself, has placed on
the value of the information in its relation to the needs of the group.
The complexities exhibited in the discussion of the four central variables
indicate that the problem of ethical limitations on sociological reporting cannot
be reduced to a simple either-or proposition of a conflict between the scientific
objectivity of a research report and the ethical inhibitions of the person who
writes the report. It is apparent that the sociologist must act simultaneously
according to a highly developed procedural code for scientific reporting and a
code of ethics based on the belief that the objects of his study are also subjects.
These codes are not irreconcilable, but the resolution of specific conflicts be-
tween them may be a very complex task, involving the claims of many groups
and the interrelationships of the four variables. Yet the sociologist must resolve
them. If there is a tendency for the sociologist to become more scientific, he
must also become increasingly sensitized to the rights, feelings, and needs of
the people he studies. Treating them as subjects means that to the best of his
ability he will treat them with justice, understanding, compassion, and, in the
last analysis, love.
The British Tradition of Social
Administration: Moral Concerns at the
Expense of Scientific Rigor
Martin Bulmer
American social science is, tentatively and perhaps belatedly, discovering
ethics, particularly in issues surrounding the uses of social science research for
policy making. Although the concern may seem novel to many social scientists,
in fact the discipline is rediscovering its roots. In Britain the links between
ethics and social science were never so completely severed, but were forged in
a quite distinctive way, through the creation of the field of Social Administra-
tion. The development of Social Administration, with its particular strengths
and weaknesses, offers a useful basis for comparing the American and British
experience.
Less than a century ago the social sciences in Britain and the United States
were directly and explicitly concerned with ethics. American sociologists such
as Albion Small and E.A. Ross combined in their teaching scientific analysis
and direct ethical prescription.1 From 1906 sociology at Harvard University was
taught in the Department of Social Ethics. In Britain leading figures such as the
social philosopher L. T. Hobhouse and the early social investigator Seebohm
Rowntree combined scientific concerns with specific ethical and political inter-
ests. A recent history of British social science between 1870 and 1914 is titled
Ethics and Society in England.2 To modern eyes several of these figures now
seem distinctly quaint, if not anachronistic, throwbacks to the origins of social
scientists from the ranks of Protestant ministers. The university professor
(mis)using his position to preach prescriptive doctrines, a practice that Max
Weber so fiercely attacked, is the prototype.3
Reprinted from The Hastings Center Report, April, 1981, pp. 35–42. Reproduced by permission.
Copyright The Hastings Center.
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The New Scientific Spirit
These early tendencies were not sustained, and those who advocated a
fusion of social science and ethics were eclipsed by those who favored more
scientific approaches to social questions. This new conception of social science
first and foremost insisted upon the objective, detached, and scientific character
of the academic study of society, modeled (to some extent at least) upon the
natural sciences. Around the end of the First World War new and distinct
disciplines (such as sociology, political science, and anthropology), each char-
acterized by particular theories and methods, took a shape still recognizable in
those disciplines today. Their practitioners concerned themselves with scientific
and analytic ends in which moral and prescriptive explorations played little or
no part. Indeed, moral concerns were regarded as an intrusion more characteris-
tic of muckrakers, do-gooders, and reformers than appropriate to new disci-
plines striving for professional status.
In the 1920s the University of Chicago, home of famous "schools" of
political science, sociology, and economics, was a leading exponent of these
trends. In political science Charles Merriam pointed the subject more in the
direction of rigorous and quantitative inquiry, and pressed for a more systematic
and expanded study of public administration.4 The scientific purpose of the
enterprise crystallized at the national level in the Social Science Research Coun-
cil, set up by Merriam in 1923.5 In sociology Robert Park represented the new
scientific spirit, advocating the detached, scientific study of social phenomena
untrammeled by political or philosophical ends. One of Park's major interests
was race relations, which he effectively established as a field of academic study
(though there had been one or two precursors, notably W. E. B. Du Bois).6 The
fierce academic passions that the study of race arouses today—it is enough to
mention the Moynihan Report on the black family of 1963; the article by Arthur
Jensen on race and IQ in the Harvard Educational Review of 1969; and the
James Coleman-Thomas Pettigrew exchanges over busing7—stand in sharp con-
trast to the dispassionate and scholarly approach that Park was able to maintain.
As Ernest Burgess recalled in a memorial festschrift, "Students attracted to the
field of race relations, whether white or negro, generally held strong sentiments
against racial discrimination and for negro rights. They were predisposed to
fight valiantly for them. Park told them flatly that the world was full of crusad-
ers. Their role instead was to be that of the calm, detached scientist who
investigates race relations with the same objectivity and detachment with which
the zoologist dissects the potato bug.8
Despite its academic base, social science was regarded as relevant for
policy formulation and the guidance of government. Merriam had been actively
involved in city politics for twenty years, nearly being elected mayor in 1911.
Park had been secretary to Booker T. Washington, and was the first president
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of the Chicago Urban League.9 Both encouraged academic studies of a markedly
applied kind, relating to policy problems. However, these studies were to be
carried out scientifically, within the framework of an academic discipline
(whether sociology or political science) with its own body of general ideas and
its own developing scientific methods of investigation. William F. Ogburn
carried on this tradition when he joined the Chicago department and undertook
(together with Wesley Mitchell and Merriam) the work for Herbert Hoover's
Commission on Recent Social Trends.10 Here was explicit policy research (a
forerunner of the modern social indicators movement, which attempts to mea-
sure social change statistically), conceived within a rigorous scientific frame-
work of detachment and objectivity, from which ethical concerns were entirely
excluded.
The tendencies begun in the 1920s have been strongly maintained in Ameri-
can social science to the present. The exclusion of value concerns is reflected
in methodological principles such as "value-freedom" in sociology; a definition
of economics ("positive economics") as the study of means to given ends; and
the use of rigorous experimental designs in psychology. It is also revealed in
empirical studies of society. In sociology, for example, the scientific social
survey has become the dominant methodology and the most widely used tech-
nique in policy research, although other types of research design also exist.
Why were philosophical elements so rigorously excluded? The main rea-
sons lie in the conception of social science as science and the drive to profes-
sional respectability. Scientists generally believed that moral and ethical judg-
ments introduced a weakness and flabbiness into scholarly work. Western social
thought in the twentieth century widely reflected the philosophical distinction
between is and ought, fact and value, the positive and the normative. Social
scientists, it was argued, should not permit their own judgments about the good
society to permeate their work any more than historians, linguists, or classical
scholars allowed moral and ethical values to color their work. The institution
of slavery, for example, might be evil and pernicious; nevertheless the task of
the social scientist was to understand it as an economic and social system and
to explain why it persisted for so long, rather than to pass judgment upon those
who originated and perpetuated it. As a recent survey by Donald Warwick, a
social psychologist, has shown, ethics acquired distinctly pejorative overtones
in the teaching of some social sciences.11
Accompanying the rise in scientific objectivity was the salience of social
science in America and its integration into the policy-making processes of the
government. Although the enterprise may not seem so vast to American social
scientists, the volume of funding, the size of particular projects, and the number
of social scientists involved take a Britisher's breath away. The status of social
science policy research in the United States is grounded in its scientific rigor.
Such respectability as it has—which certainly should not be exaggerated—rests
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on methodological competence and sophistication and the ability to produce
representative and reliable evidence bearing on relevant policy problems.
Fundamental Questions
Recently, however, some social scientists have argued that the claims to
scientific rigor have been oversold, that the discipline cannot deliver the goods
that it promises to produce.12 It is certainly not clear that more social science
data have led to greater clarity about policy objectives. One thinks, for example,
of David Cohen's account of the effects of educational research on policy in the
twenty-five years since the Brown v. Board of Education desegregation deci-
sion.13
True, critical voices have been raised before. Throughout the last half-
century, some have asked whether academic social scientists were as disinter-
ested as they claimed to be. Writers such as Thorstein Veblen, Karl Mannheim,
Robert S. Lynd, Gunnar Myrdal, and C. Wright Mills pointed to the various
ways in which social background, material interests, political beliefs, and moral
concerns entered into the background assumptions, analytical frameworks, and
conclusions of mainstream social science. But their critiques failed to have a
major impact until the late 1960s and early 1970s. At this point a variety of
developments coalesced.
Social ferment, particularly in universities in the industrial world, led to
critical questioning of received theories of social science such as "structural-
functionalism" and marginalist economics. Attacks by thinkers as diverse as
Charles Taylor, Herbert Marcuse, Harrington Moore, Jr., Alvin Gouldner, and
Richard Bernstein evoked support that had formerly been lacking. Greater open-
ness to philosophy began to characterize several social science disciplines.
Major ethical and political discussions focused on particular pieces of empirical
social science research, from the secret tape recording of the Wichita juries in
the 1950s, through the Moynihan Report, the U.S. Army-sponsored research
in Chile called Project Camelot in the 1960s, to the covert observations of
homosexual encounters described in Laud Humphrey's book Tearoom Trade
and the Coleman-Pettigrew debate over busing in the 1970s.
In the last fifteen years federal support for social science has increased
dramatically, following the enormous increase in federal expenditure on social
welfare. New styles of policy research such as social experimentation and evalu-
ation research have tended toward the hard, more scientific, end of the spectrum
of social science methodologies. But the growth of such research has also led
to penetrating questions about the ends that were being pursued and the alterna-
tives that might be chosen. Even apparently "scientific" enterprises such as the
large-scale negative income-tax experiment led to queries about whether the
experimenters were not circumscribing the policy options in order to make their
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work more acceptable to legislators. The applications of social science to public
policy raised philosophical questions more fundamental and more problematic
than had hitherto been suspected.
Ethics in the Welfare State
Ethical issues underlying social science policy are now firmly on the agenda
for public discussion. British experience seems likely to be relevant here, par-
ticularly in its tradition of Social Administration. Why has one particular aca-
demic area of study—that of social policy and administration—evolved a mark-
edly different relationship among the social sciences, policy analysis, and the
policy-making process, in which ethical concerns figure as central? This discus-
sion is not an account of British social science as a whole, or of British sociol-
ogy or British political science. It focuses on one particular field of study in
order to examine the relationships between academic social science and public
policy.
Social Administration has no precise academic parallel in America. Its
nearest equivalent in the United States would be a hypothetical department that
embraced applied economists, applied sociologists, political scientists interested
in policy analysis, social historians of the state provision of welfare, and social
philosophers with interests in citizenship and social justice. To my knowledge,
no such department exists. Social Administration's most remarkable feature is
its ability to blend analysis with moral concern to produce a subject of practical
import.
Social Administration exists in British universities in separate departments
of that title distinct from departments of sociology, political science, and eco-
nomics. Nor is it to be confused with the teaching of social workers, which is a
distinct and separate function. It is interdisciplinary, bringing knowledge from
different fields to bear on understanding how welfare policies have developed
in fields like housing, education, social services, income maintenance, health,
race relations, and social deviance. The contributory disciplines include sociol-
ogy, psychology, political science, economics, philosophy, history and—in a
different relationship—statistics.14 It is an academic, not a professional, subject,
though some undergraduates go on to professional courses in social work later.
Social Administration in Britain does not have a monopoly on policy stud-
ies. Political scientists study policy-making processes. The field of international
relations is of course well developed either on its own or as part of political
science. On the domestic front, industrial relations is usually taught in separate
departments, and not covered in Social Administration teaching. In a few uni-
versities there are special departments of criminology and/or of race relations,
but more usually these are part of Social Administration. Though professional
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social-work training is separate, teaching and research on policy in the personal
social services (that is, the delivery of social-work services) are part of the field.
There is a close connection between the subject of Social Administration
and the development of the British welfare state. The subject focuses on identify-
ing social needs and determining the structure of administration necessary to
satisfy them. It studies the nature and distribution of social benefits and social
costs; the rights and duties of the citizen both as contributor to and consumer
of social services; and the three systems of welfare (social, occupational, and
fiscal) that constitute collective intervention to meet selected needs. The admin-
istrative structure that meets these needs includes state education, social secu-
rity, the National Health Service, local authority housing (what Americans call
public housing), and other directly administered services and transfer payments.
Benefits may be provided—needs may be met—either in cash (for example,
social security payments) or in kind (for example, free hospital services), but
in all cases government and not the economic market is the allocating agent for
rights, duties, and collective consumption. The ideal toward which government
is striving is "integrated community services, preventive in outlook and of high
quality for all citizens in all areas irrespective of means, social class, occupation
or ethnic group."15
The academic study of Social Administration as a distinct subject originated
with the growth of the welfare state. The subject developed in British universi-
ties in the period after 1945, when large-scale welfare legislation was being
passed. In addition to empirical analysis of its actual workings, there was direct
discussion of philosophical issues. Many of the subject's most distinguished
practitioners—Richard Titmuss and Peter Townsend in Britain, Martin rein in
America, 16 to name but three—have emphasized the role that positive value
choice has played in the direction of their academic research. Many of its British
practitioners have either been active members of the Fabian Society—a small,
elite intellectual group of social democrats founded by Beatrice and Sidney
Webb and George Bernard Shaw in the 1890s—or have maintained close links
with civil servants and politicians in London.17 Others, coming from a back-
ground in economics, have pointed to the operation of market forces in welfare
provision and have been less identified with social-democratic politics.
At the academic core of the subject is a concept of "need," which is
philosophical and value-laden in a way that concepts in other subjects ("social
system" in sociology, "government" and "power" in political science) are
not. It provides a direct link to ethics and an avenue by which ethical criteria
may be fed into social science. The importance of this value element has been
recognized by leading social scientists such as R. H. Tawney, Gunnar Myrdal,
and C. Wright Mills; their writings are widely used in teaching Social Admini-
stration students.
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"Need" is usually defined with reference to an existing state of affairs and
a desired end that is different from the status quo. "To speak of a need is to
imply a goal, a measureable deficiency from the goal, and a means of achieving
the goal. The goals may be set by some sort of concensus within society, by the
person in need ('felt' need) or by experts with a knowledge or specific means
for achieving particular aims."18 In specifying need several different approaches
have been followed, including the postulation of ideal norms ("good health"),
minimum standards ("freedom from want"), comparative definitions (cross-
national comparisons of low-income groups), or "felt" needs (relative depriva-
tion).
Writers in the British tradition have been readier to employ the concept of
need that to analyze it deeply. Recently, they have come under attack from
fellow-practitioners with backgrounds in economics for indulging in
"needology" 19 and for making heavily value-laden statements of the "need"
for more and better public services, whether in the health, housing, education,
social security, or personal social science fields. Economists such as Alan
Williams and A. A. Nevitt urge an approach based on "demand" rather than
"need," or a redefinition of social needs as "demands which have been defined
by society as sufficiently important to qualify for social recognition as goods
or services which should be met by government interventions."20 According to
this view, if a social need has not been recognized and converted into a public
demand, it behooves those who have identified it to change public taste and
show that other goods and services should be deferred in order to meet the new
demand that this need creates.
This controversy continues, but both sides recognize that the allocation of
resources between competing ends in the social field involves choices that are
partly a matter of value judgment. Whether postulated as "needs" or "de-
mands," ethical criteria are relevant in determining how social priorities should
be ranked in allocating resources.
Social Choices in Allocating Resources
An excellent example of this approach is provided by the last book of
Richard Titmuss, the founder of Social Administration in Britain and undoubt-
edly its greatest figure. Titmuss was professor of Social Administration in the
Department of Social Science & Administration at the London School of Eco-
nomics, the leading department in the subject in Britain. He held that post from
1950 until his death at the age of sixty-five in 1973. Titmuss was a most unusual
man, not least because he was appointed to the senior chair in the subject
without ever having held a university post. Like Robert Park, who came to
sociology late via journalism, Titmuss was then over forty. Unlike Park, who
had a Harvard M.A. and German Ph.D., Titmuss had no university degree at
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all, and never obtained one (other than honorary degrees). Yet by the time
Titmuss died, "he had created a new discipline and was one of the few truly
original social scientists of his generation."21
The Gift Relationship, published in 1970,22 is a study of the provision, in
different societies, of human blood for transfusion. Medical services require a
regular and predictable supply of blood; modern medicine requires blood in
ever larger quantities. How is that need to be met? To show that different
societies meet the different ways, Titmuss developed an eightfold typology
along a continuum from the paid donor at one extreme to the voluntary commu-
nity donor at the other. The paid donor is motivated solely by the promise of
cash compensation, the voluntary community donor strictly by the altruistic
desire to give to strangers regardless of what he or she gets in return. In between
are various arrangements with different degrees of compensation to the donor
in cash or kind, or the granting of rights and privileges for the receipt of blood
to individuals or groups, in return for individual donations. Titmuss concluded
that the differences among, say, Britain, the United States, and Russia could
not be attributed simply to administrative and organizational structures of blood
supply systems and patterns of medical care services. "Different social and
political structures and value systems," he argued , "strongly determine"
which type of donation is characteristic of a particular society. "Explanations—
and admittedly explanations can never be more that partial-have to be sought
in the history, the values and the political ideas of each society."23
This statement exemplifies a more general principle. Social policy presup-
poses social choices, which presuppose social values. These values must evolve
from widely held attitudes rather than be imposed from above by a power elite.
Societies, like individuals, must make choices, and in a democracy these
choices must be made collectively. Titmuss says, "Social policy mod-
e ls . . . with all their apparent remoteness from reality, can serve a purpose in
providing us with an ideological framework which may stimulate us to ask the
significant questions and to expose the significant choices."24
The Gift Relationship considered in detail the ease by which blood is ob-
tained under different systems, its purity, its cost per unit, and its wastage
(human blood has a ''shelf life" of not more than three weeks). It also examined
who the donors were, and why they sold, lent, or gave their blood. This led to
a study of the social relationships involved in blood donation, the "quality of
life" implied on the one and by response to the market and on the other by
giving for the general good. In addition to exploring the connection between
different systems of blood provision, the book examined the objectives of social
policy, altruism in society, and gift relationships—hence the title. Nor was
Titmuss wary of prescription. He demonstrated that the national-collectivist
blood transfusion system in Britain was far more efficient than the market
systems in other societies (such as the United States) on almost any criterion—
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availability, cheapness, purity of blood, economy in its use. (The blood debate
goes on, however, with some critics charging that the American market system
is not nearly so disastrous or the British voluntary system so rosy as Titmuss
claimed.25 Because British donors gave blood entirely on a voluntary basis, with
only a cup of tea as their reward, Titmuss linked this finding to a broader
philosophical principle, the role of altruism in modern society. Altruism, he
argued, is present in many different types of social relationships, including those
for social provision. Analytic social sciences—such as economics—that fail to
identify such social relations have omitted a main motive power in human
existence.
A different field of empirical research, the study of poverty, also exempli-
fies the fusion of moral and philosophical concerns with empirical inquiry. A
long British tradition of poverty studies goes back to Henry Mayhew, Charles
Booth, and Seebohm Rowntree. In the recent past several notable inquiries have
demonstrated the extent of poverty in contemporary Britain and argued for state
action to meet the needs of those living on low incomes. The most notable
studies are Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend's The Poor and the Poorest26
and Townsend's Poverty in the United Kingdom.27 The latter makes a consid-
erable theoretical contribution, as do W. G. Runciman's Relative Deprivation
and Social Justice28 (which incorporates an explicit discussion of John Rawls)
and Dorothy Wedderburn's symposium on Poverty, Inequality and Class Struc-
ture.29 These studies will give the American reader the flavor of British Social
Administration. But for those who wish to peruse the wide range of empirical
studies in the different specialist fields mentioned earlier, a useful bibliographi-
cal guide is available. 30
Distinguishing Traits
What follows is an attempt to roughly summarize the more distinctive
features of academic Social Administration. Because Titmuss was so central in
the development of the subject, his work figures prominently. First, Social
Administration is a continuation of a strain in academic social science that sees
moral criticism as the legitimate concern of the scholar. Distinguished figures
such as Thorstein Veblen, R. H. Tawney, Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth
Galbraith, and C. Wright Mills, though differing in discipline and orientation,
all show a marked philosophical bent in their writing. Similarly, in Social
Administration fundamental debate about society's purposes and ways of meet-
ing various conditions and circumstances is recognized as a proper part of
academic study. In many areas of social policy, radical choices have to be made
between competing social values. The realization that ultimately these decisions
are made by the executive arm of government and by politicians does not rule
out their academic study. Two notable examples of this type of analysis are
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Rawl's work on justice, and Tawney's classic The Acquisitive Society. Though
more sardonic in tone, some of Veblen's writing might fall into the same class.
In the last analysis, Titmuss wrote, human welfare is an ethical concept.
Second, in Social Administration one of the most important dimensions of
choice is the manner in which certain social needs (health care, for example) are
to be met: by the individual or by the government? Through individualism or
collectivism? Titmuss was originally a Liberal politically, and his belief in
collectivism was not a doctrinaire position but arose out of observation of the
"enterprise, efficiency and compassion" with which the British central govern-
ment after Dunkirk and through the blitz met the need for national mobiliza-
tion.31 He came to believe strongly in services that were provided universally
rather than selectively; services free of social discrimination; services that in-
volved the pooling of risks and the sharing of national resources. The English
National Health Service, for all its imperfections, exemplified many of these
features.
It is important to emphasize that this belief in collectivism was no mere
whim or value choice, but an integral part of an intellectual enterprise, closely
linked to an analysis of the social consequences of industrialism and urbanism
for a complex and highly differentiated society. The theme is not unique—
Harold L. Wilensky, C. L. Lebaux,32 and Gaston V. Rimlinger,33 for example,
have developed similar ideas. Such a position contrasts sharply with the indi-
vidualist tenets of certain other social scientists. A leading economist at the
University of Chicago and his wife have recently been extolling in the media the
virtues of individualism and of the market as mechanisms for resource alloca-
tion. Whether in such popularizations or in his more scholarly work, Milton
Friedman is one among many who builds value premises into the propositions
from which his theory is constructed. Within Social Administration there is
lively debate between collectivists and individualists, proponents of the state
and of the market, of legislative or voluntary solutions to social welfare provi-
sion. Titmuss was a staunch collectivist, but the subject as a whole is no longer
collectivist in outlook.
Third, Social Administration takes as a central theme a concern with citi-
zenship, developing further the seminal ideas of T. H. Marshall.34 Two impor-
tant questions to ask of modern industrial societies are: who is a member of the
society? and what rights do members have? Foreign migrant labor, which now
constitutes 12 percent of West Germany's work force and between 2 and 5
percent of the American work force, poses this sort of issue very sharply.35
Thirty years ago the questions related much more to the position of the working
class in Britain and to that of blacks in the United States. An important element
in Titmuss's belief in collectivism held that common access to social services
was a badge of citizenship, the only way of distributing social rights without
discrimination and stigma. Hence this tendency to favor universalism, with
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positive discrimination to divert resources to the poor, handicapped, and minor-
ity groups.36
Fourth, a further characteristic of Social Administration is its solid empiri-
cal base. Titmuss's early work focused on population and public health in the
British tradition of "political arithmetic" (the compilation of statistical data
about a society, particularly demographic and socio-medical data). His later
work retained this meticulous factual documentation, meshed with a broad
philosophical perspective.
An American Comparison
This very brief and compressed characterization highlights the
distinctiveness of the Social Administration approach, which should be of inter-
est to American social scientists and policy-makers. A comparison of American
developments with those taking place elsewhere can throw fresh light on the
choices open to American social science policy studies at the present time,
particularly given the doubts that are being expressed about their general objec-
tives. What can be learned from a comparison with this British tradition?
In the immediate postwar period, America was still markedly individualistic
in its approach to welfare provision, with widespread political hostility to exten-
sion of government welfare.37 But since 1965 the proportions of the Gross
National Product spent on social welfare have narrowed between the United
States and Britain, with the American share rising. An English academic com-
menting on America has to beware of presenting a caricature of America as it
was fifteen to twenty years ago, though in the health policy field the differences
are still extremely marked. One explanation for the development of American
policy studies, evaluation research, and social experimentation is surely this
enormous increase, particularly in federal government expenditure on social
welfare. The consequent academic growth in America has been in "hard" or
"harder" social sciences of this type. In Britain this has not been the case.
It is a truism to say that "government" does not mean the same thing in
Britain and in America. Not only do the political systems of the two countries
differ markedly, but (more relevant here) they differ in the respect accorded to
academic experts in each society, in the position of the social sciences, and in
institutional support for social science. The wide public hearing that social
science expertise commands in the United States contrasts with greater skepti-
cism within the smaller, close-knit world of the British political elite. The
relative position has been summed up by Oxford political scientist L. J. Sharpe,
who compares the British social scientist visiting America to the English chef
visiting Paris.38
The connections between Social Administration and Fabian activism are
particularly revealing of the close relationship between the academic and political
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worlds in England. The Fabian Society embraces Labour politicians, academics,
and some civil servants. It is allied loosely to the Labour Party, but distinct from
it. Titmuss was a committed Fabian, as are his contemporary successors such
as Abel-Smith and Townsend. (To a British observer it is puzzling that Daniel
Moynihan may move from advising Richard Nixon to become a Democratic
Senator. In Britain such a change of sides would likely be political suicide.)
An illuminating recent study by Keith Banting has shown how close the political
and academic links can be, and what a marked impact British academic intellec-
tuals had on social policies in relation to poverty, housing, and education during
the 1960s.39 Whether such close links with policy makers and "political admin-
istrators" are good for the health of the social sciences is another matter.
The role of theory in the social sciences also differs sharply between the
two countries. It may be only a slight exaggeration to say that in the British
social sciences strong theoretical interests and strong applied interests seem
antithetical. British sociology is strong on theory, moderate on empirical re-
search, and notably weak on policy applications. By contrast, Social Admini-
stration (which historically and departmentally usually branched off from sociol-
ogy) is strong on application, moderate on empirical research, and extremely
weak on theory. The absence of scientific rigor in Social Administration can be
seen as much in the realm of theory as methodology. Many of its practitioners
conceive of it less as a science than as humanistic social science with strong
links to history and philosophy and ethics. It is not distinguished by a coherent
body of theory, though it does make use of a set of distinctive concepts that
include "need," "welfare," and "citizenship."
As one critic has pointed out, the peculiar blend of empirical data and
philosophy thrive at the expense of theory-'too much is prescribed, too little is
explained." Robert Pinker suggests that "in British social policy and admini-
stration we begin with fact-finding and end in moral rhetoric, still lacking those
explanatory theories that might show the process as a whole and reveal the
relations of the separate problems to one another."40 Here British Social Ad-
ministration diverges most markedly from American social science and policy
studies. Men of the caliber of Merriam and Park gave American social science
its cutting edge by insisting first and foremost that social science was science—
not philosophy, not social reform, not history. Whether this goal has been
achieved is highly debatable, but several generations of social scientists have
acted to a considerable extent as if it has succeeded.
Britain and America differ significantly, too, in the place of empirical data
and the role of research methodology in social science. Although British social
policy research (both academic and governmental) is highly empirical, the use
made of empirical data is still largely "empiricist" in the correct (and pejora-
tive) sense of that term—that is, based on the view that the facts speak for
themselves. Such a view verges on the prescientific, in the sense that a data-
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collecting activity like the Census, though providing materials for social sci-
ence, would not in itself be regarded as social science. Here the differences
between Britain and America seem to be greatest. This poses a fascinating
question: to what extent is there a trade-off between scientific rigor and ethical
commitment? Does one tend to drive out the other? To what extent can philo-
sophical and ethical premises be introduced explicitly into general frameworks
in social science without fundamentally changing the nature of those frame-
works? The undoubted strengths of British Social Administration are its blend
of philosophical concerns, historical sense and specificity, and policy focus.
But these are achieved at the expense of formal theory and rigorous methodol-
ogy as those are usually understood, particularly in the United States. Does the
former set of characteristics tend to preclude the latter?
Is it possible to integrate formal theory and rigorous methodology with
historical and ethical sensitivity? If some American "policy science" reads like
arid scholasticism, which does little to illuminate the real world, some British
work on social policy reads like moral rhetoric, resisting systematization and
methodologically weak. Excessively scientific policy research is equally unat-
tractive, preoccupied with formalization and methodological rigor, without at-
tention to the moral ends of policy or the historical circumstances in which
policy is enacted.
Some middle way is surely possible. The overblown claims of "policy
science" need to be firmly resisted, and the belief that the social sciences
constitute a new "social engineering" exposed for the self-serving cant that it
is. The social sciences should provide a general framework within which social
processes can be examined—the "enlightenment" model.41 They need not pro-
vide definite predictions about the direction of social change, nor offer techno-
cratic solutions to discrete problems. But the framework must necessarily take
account of the ends of social action, and deal with the moral dimension of
human affairs.
On the other hand, American social science has demonstrated over the last
sixty years that methodological standards matter, and that empirical inquiry
needs to be rigorous, systematic, and located within a proper theoretical frame-
work. In these respects, British Social Administration is singularly inadequate,
and could greatly strengthen its theoretical and methodological backbone. If the
goal of social science is understanding and explanation, much more attention
needs to be paid to the structure of the explanations that are being offered. It is
possible, for example, for critics to dismiss The Gift Relationship as a flawed
and polemical moral tract, and there is a slight element of truth in the charge,
despite the illustrative empirical material included in it and the overall convic-
tion of the comparative analysis.
Moral concerns do have a place in social policy research, but this place is
not preeminent, as Park and Merriam clearly recognized long ago. If moral
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concerns are preeminent, as in certain British social policy writing, then the
persuasiveness and influence of the writer is significantly weakened, since his
work can be dismissed as mere emotional rhetoric. The answer is not to discard
a moral dimension altogether, but to combine it with an adequate theoretical and
methodological structure. In this respect, Gunnar Myrdal's magisterial survey
of American race relations more than a generation ago, An American Di-
lemma ,42 remains a model of the fusion between ethics and science that is both
compelling and methodologically adequate.
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Sociological Practice Association
Ethical Standards of Sociological
Practitioners
Preamble
Clinical and applied sociologists respect the dignity and worth of the indi-
vidual and honor the preservation and protection of fundamental human rights.
They are committed to increasing knowledge of human behavior and of peoples'
understanding of themselves and others and to the utilization of such knowledge
for the promotion of human welfare. While pursuing these endeavors, they
make every effort to protect the welfare of those who seek their services or of
any human group, or animal(s) that may be the object of study. They use their
skills only for purposes consistent with these values and do not knowingly
permit their misuse by others. While demanding for themselves freedom of
inquiry and communication, clinical and applied sociologists accept the respon-
sibility this freedom requires: competence, objectivity in the application of skills
and concern for the best interests of clients, colleagues, and society in general.
In the pursuit of these ideals, clinical and applied sociologists subscribe to the
following principles: (1) Responsibility, (2) Competence, (3) Moral and Legal
Standards, (4) Public Statements, (5) Confidentiality, (6) Welfare of the Student,
Client and Research Subject, and (7) Regard for Professionals and Institutions.
Principle 1
Responsibility
In their commitment to the understanding of human behavior, clinical and
applied sociologists value objectivity and integrity, and in providing services
The model for this draft is the 1977 APA approved Ethical Standards of Psychologists: adopted
September 1982, revised August 1985, revised June 1987.
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they maintain the highest standards of their profession. They accept responsibil-
ity for the consequences of their work and make every effort to insure that their
services are used appropriately. The clinical or applied sociologist is committed
to avoid any act or suggestion that would support or advance racism, sexism or
ageism.
a. As scientists, clinical and applied sociologists accept the ultimate re-
sponsibility for selecting appropriate areas and methods most relevant
to these areas. They plan their research in ways to minimize the possi-
bility that their findings will be misleading. They provide thorough
discussion of the limitations of their data and alternative explanations,
especially where their work touches on social policy or might be con-
strued to the detriment of persons in specific age, sex, ethnic, socioeco-
nomic or other social groups. In publishing reports of their work, they
never suppress discomforming data. Clinical and applied sociologists
take credit only for the work they have actually done.
Clinical and applied sociologists clarify in advance with all appro-
priate persons or agencies the expectations for sharing and utilizing
research data. They avoid dual relationships which may limit objectiv-
ity, whether political or monetary, so that interference with data, hu-
man participants, and milieu is kept to a minimum.
b. As employees of an institution or agency, clinical and applied sociolo-
gists have the responsibility of remaining alert to and attempting to
moderate institutional pressures that may distort reports of clinical or
applied sociological findings or impede their proper use.
c. As teachers, clinical and applied sociologists recognize their primary
obligation to help others acquire knowledge and skill. They maintain
high standards of scholarship and objectivity by presenting information
fully and accurately.
d. As practitioners, clinical and applied sociologists know that they bear
a heavy social responsibility because their recommendations and pro-
fessional actions may alter the lives of others. They are alert to per-
sonal, social, organizational, financial, or political situations or pres-
sures that might lead to misuse of their influence.
e. As employers or supervisors, clinical and applied sociologists provide
adequate and timely evaluations to employees, trainees, students, and




The maintenance of high standards of professional competence is a respon-
sibility shared by all clinical and applied sociologists in the interest of the public
and the profession as a whole. Clinical and applied sociologists recognize the
boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their techniques and only
provide services, use techniques, or offer opinions as professionals that meet
recognized standards. Clinical and applied sociologists maintain knowledge of
current scientific and professional information related to the services they ren-
der.
a. Teaching. Clinical and applied sociologists perform their duties on the
basis of careful preparation so that their instruction is accurate, current
and scholarly.
b. Professional Development. Clinical and applied sociologists recognize
the need for continuing education and are open to new procedures and
changes in expectations and values over time. They recognize differ-
ences among people, such as those that may be associated with age,
sex, socioeconomic, and ethnic backgrounds. Where relevant, they
obtain training, experience, or counsel to assure competent services or
research relating to such persons.
c. Professional Effectiveness. Clinical and applied sociologists recognize
that their effectiveness depends in part upon their ability to maintain
effective interpersonal relations, and that aberrations on their part may
interfere with their abilities. They refrain from undertaking any activity
in which their personal problems are likely to lead to inadequate profes-
sional services or harm to a client; or, if engaged in such activity when
they become aware of their personal problems, they seek competent
professional assistance to determine whether they should suspend, ter-
minate or limit the scope of their professional and/or scientific activi-
ties.
Principle 3
Moral and Legal Standards
Clinical and applied sociologists' moral, ethical and legal standards of
behavior are a personal matter to the same degree as they are for any other
citizen, except as these may compromise the fulfillment of their professional
responsibilities, or reduce the trust in clinical or applied sociology or clinical
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or applied sociologists held by the general public. Regarding their own behav-
ior, clinical and applied sociologists should be aware of the prevailing commu-
nity standards and of the possible impact upon the quality of professional ser-
vices provided by their conformity to or deviation from these standards.
a. As teachers, clinical and applied sociologists are aware of the diverse
backgrounds of students and, when dealing with topics that may give
offense, treat the material objectively and present it in a manner for
which the student is prepared.
b. As employees, clinical and applied sociologists refuse to participate in
practices inconsistent with legal, moral and ethical standards regarding
the treatment of employees or of the public. For example, clinical and
applied sociologists will not condone practices that are inhumane or
that result in illegal or otherwise unjustifiable discrimination on the
basis of race, age, sex, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or
disability in hiring, promotion or training.
c. As practitioners, clinical and applied sociologists avoid any action that
will violate or diminish the legal and civil rights of clients or of others
who may be affected by their actions.
d. Both as practitioners and researchers, clinical and applied sociologists
remain abreast of relevant federal, state, local and agency regulations
and Association standards of practice concerning the conduct of their
practice or of their research. They are concerned with developing such
legal and quasi-legal regulations as best serve the public interest and




Public statements, announcements of services, and promotional activities
of clinical and applied sociologists serve the purpose of providing sufficient
information to aid the consumer public in making informed judgments and
choices. Clinical and applied sociologists represent accurately and completely
their professional qualifications, affiliations and functions, as well as those of
the institutions or organizations with which they or the statements may be
associated. In public statements, providing sociological information or profes-
sional opinions or providing information about the availability of sociological
products and services, clinical and applied sociologists take full account of the
limits and uncertainties of present sociological knowledge and techniques.
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a. Announcement of Professional Services. Normally, such announce-
ments are limited to name, academic degrees, credentials, address and
telephone number and, at the individual practitioner's discretion, an
appropriate brief listing of the types of services offered, and fee infor-
mation. Such statements are descriptive of services provided but not
evaluative. They do not claim uniqueness of skills or methods unless
determined by acceptable and public scientific evidence.
b. In announcing the availability of clinical or applied sociological ser-
vices or products, clinical or applied sociologists do not display any
affiliations with an organization in a manner that falsely implies the
sponsorship or certification of that organization. In particular and for
example, clinical and applied sociologists do not offer SPA member-
ship as evidence of qualification. They do not name their employer or
professional associations unless the services are in fact to be provided
by or under the responsible, direct supervision and continuing control
of such organizations or agencies.
c. Announcements of training activities give a clear statement of purpose
and the nature of the experiences to be provided. The education, train-
ing and experience of the clinical or applied sociologists sponsoring
such activities are appropriately specified.
d. Clinical and applied sociologists associated with the development or
promotion of devices, books or other products offered for commercial
sale make every effort to insure that announcements and advertisements
are presented in a professional, scientifically acceptable, and factually
informative manner.
e. Clinical and applied sociologists do not participate as clinical or applied
sociologists for personal gain in commercial announcements recom-
mending to the general public the purchase or use of any proprietary
or single-source product or service.
f. Clinical and applied sociologists who interpret the science of sociology
or the services of clinical or applied sociologists to the general public
accept the obligation to present the material fairly and accurately avoid-
ing misrepresentation through sensationalism, exaggeration or superfi-
ciality. Clinical and applied sociologists are guided by the primary
obligation to aid the public in forming their own informed judgments,
opinions and choices.
g. As teachers, clinical and applied sociologists insure that statements in
catalogs and course outlines are accurate and sufficient, particularly in
terms of subject matter to be covered, bases for evaluating progress,
and nature of course experiences. Announcements or brochures de-
scribing workshops, seminars, or other educational programs accurately
represent intended audience and eligibility requirements, educational
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objectives, and nature of the material to be covered, as well as the
education, training and experience of the clinical or applied sociolo-
gists presenting the programs, and in which clinical services or other
professional services are offered as an inducement make clear the na-
ture of the services, as well as the costs and other obligations to be
accepted by the human participants in the research.
h. Clinical and applied sociologists accept the obligation to correct others
who represent the clinical and applied sociologist's professional quali-
fications or associations with products or services in a manner incom-
patible with these guidelines.
Principle 5
Confidentiality
Safeguarding information about an individual or group that has been ob-
tained by the clinical or applied sociologist in the course of teaching, practice,
or research, is a primary obligation of the sociologist. Such information is not
communicated to others unless certain important conditions are met.
a. Information received in confidence is revealed only after most careful
deliberation and when there is clear and imminent danger to an individ-
ual or to society, and then only to appropriate professional workers or
public authorities.
b. Information obtained in clinical or consulting relationships, or evalu-
ative data concerning children, students, employees, and others are
discussed only for professional purposes and only with persons clearly
concerned with the case. Written and oral reports present only data
germane to the purposes of the evaluation and every effort is made to
avoid undue invasion of privacy.
c. Confidential materials may be used in classroom teaching and writing
only when the identity of the persons involved is adequately disguised.
d. The confidentiality of professional communications about individuals
is maintained. Only when the originator and other persons involved
give their express permission is a confidential professional communica-
tion shown to the individual concerned. The clinical or applied sociolo-
gist is responsible for informing the client of the limits of the confiden-
tiality.
e. Where research data are being made public, the clinical or applied
sociologist assumes responsibility for protecting the privacy of the
subjects involved if confidentiality has been promised or called for by
the nature of the research.
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Principle 6
Welfare of the Student, Client and Research Participant
Clinical and applied sociologists respect the integrity and protect the wel-
fare of the people and groups with whom they work. When there is a conflict
of interest between the client and the clinical or applied sociologist's employing
institution, clinical and applied sociologists clarify the nature and direction of
their loyalties and responsibilities and keep all parties informed of their commit-
ments. Clinical and applied sociologists inform consumers as to the purpose and
nature of evaluation, treatment, educational or training procedures and they
freely acknowledge that clients, students or participants in research have free-
dom of choice with regard to participation.
a. Clinical and applied sociologists are continually cognizant of their own
needs and of their inherently powerful position vis-a-vis clients, stu-
dents and research participants, in order to avoid exploiting their trust
and dependency. Clinical and applied sociologists make every effort
to avoid dual relationships with clients and/or relationships which
might impair their professional judgment. Examples of such dual rela-
tionships include treating employees, supervisors, close friends or rela-
tives. Special care is taken to ensure that clients, students and research
participants are not exploited in any manner, e.g., sexually, politically,
economically, emotionally or socially.
b. Where demands of an organization on clinical or applied sociologists
go beyond reasonable conditions of employment, clinical and applied
sociologists recognize possible conflicts of interest that may arise.
When such conflicts occur, clinical and applied sociologists clarify the
nature of the conflict and inform all parties of the nature and direction
of the loyalties and responsibilities involved.
c. When acting as a supervisor, trainer, researcher, or employer, clinical
and applied sociologists accord informed choice, confidentiality, due
process, and protection from physical and mental harm to their subordi-
nates in such relationships.
d. Financial arrangements in professional practice are in accord with pro-
fessional standards that safeguard the best interests of the client and
that are clearly understood by the client in advance of billing. Clinical
and applied sociologists are responsible for assisting clients in finding
needed services in those instances where payment of the usual fee
would be a hardship. No commission, rebate, or other form of remu-
neration may be given or received for referral of clients for professional
services, whether by an individual or by an agency. Clinical and
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applied sociologists willingly contribute a portion of their services to
work for which they receive little or no financial return,
e. The clinical or applied sociologist attempts to terminate a clinical or
consulting relationship when it is reasonably clear that the consumer
is not benefiting from it. Clinical and applied sociologists who find
that their services are being used by employers in a way that is not
beneficial to the participants or to employees who may be affected, or
to significant others, have the responsibility to make their observations
known to the parties involved and to propose modifications or termina-
tion of the engagement.
Principle 7
Relationships with Professionals and Institutions
Clinical and applied sociologists act with due regard for the needs, special
competencies and obligations of their colleagues in sociology, other profes-
sions, and the institutions or organizations with which they are associated.
Special care is taken to insure that colleagues are not exploited in any manner,
e.g., sexually, politically, economically, emotionally or socially.
a. Clinical and applied sociologists understand the areas of competence
of related professions, and make full use of all the professional, techni-
cal, and administrative resources that best serve the interest of consum-
ers. The absence of formal relationships with other professional work-
ers does not relieve clinical or applied sociologists from the responsibil-
ity of securing for their clients the best possible professional service,
nor does it relieve them from the exercise of foresight, diligence, and
tact in obtaining the complimentary or alternative assistance needed
by clients.
b. Clinical and applied sociologists respect other professional groups and
cooperate with members of such groups.
c. Clinical and applied sociologists who employ or supervise other profes-
sionals or professionals in training accept the obligation to facilitate
their further professional development by providing suitable working
conditions, consultation and experience opportunities.
d. As employees of organizations providing clinical or applied sociologi-
cal services, or as independent clinical or applied sociologists serving
clients in an organizational context, clinical and applied sociologists
seek to support the integrity, reputation and proprietary rights of the
host organization. When it is judged necessary in a client's interest to
question the organization's programs or policies, clinical and applied
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sociologists attempt to affect change by constructive action within the
organization before disclosing confidential information acquired in
their professional roles.
e. In the pursuit of research, clinical and applied sociologists give spon-
soring agencies, host institutions, and publication channels the same
respect and opportunity for giving informed consent that they accord
to individual research participants. They are aware of their obligation
to future research workers and insure that host institutions are given
adequate information about the research and proper acknowledgment
of their contributions.
f. Publication credit is assigned to all those who have contributed to a
publication in proportion to their contributions. Major contributions of
a professional character made by several persons to a common project
are recognized by joint authorship, with the researcher or author who
made the principle contribution identified and listed first. Minor contri-
butions of a professional character, extensive clerical or similar non-
professional assistance, and other minor contributions are acknowl-
edged in footnotes or in an introductory statement. Acknowledgment
through specific citations is made for unpublished, as well as published
material that has directly influenced the research or writing. A clinical
or applied sociologist who compiles and edits material of others for
publication publishes the material in the name of the originating group,
if any, and with his/her own name appearing as chairperson or editor.
All contributions are to be acknowledged and named.
Violations
Procedures Governing Alleged Violations of Ethical Standards
When a clinical or applied sociologist, who is a member of the Sociological
Practice Association, violates ethical standards, clinical and applied sociologists
who know first-hand of such activities should, if possible, attempt to rectify the
situation. Failing an informal solution, clinical and applied sociologists bring
such unethical activities to the attention of the Chair of the Ethics Committee.
The Ethics Committee will consider the matter and the Chair of the Ethics
Committee will forward the recommendation of the Committee to the Executive
Board of the Sociological Practice Association for disposition.
